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Matthew Certosimo* A Conflict is a Conflict is a
Conflict:** Fiduciary Duty and
Lawyer - Client Sexual Relations
Introduction
Does a lawyer breach his' fiduciary duty by engaging in sexual activity
with a client?' The Nova Scotia Barristers' Society is attempting to
answer this very question with a proposed Rule in the Legal Ethics and
ProfessionalResponsibility Handboo3 : Chapter 244 on Sexual Relation-
* LL.B. 1993 (Dalhousie). The author wishes to acknowledge and express gratitude for the
patience and guidance of Professor Innis Christie, whose careful and constructive criticism was
instrumental in the writing of this paper. The author also wishes to thank Darrel Pink and Alan
Stem, Q.C., of the Nova Scotia Bar Society and Professor Hugh Kindred for his editorial
guidance.
** With apologies to Gertrude Stein's Sacred Emily ("Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.").
1. Although gender neutral language is preferred, in this context the problem being addressed
is not, unfortunately, gender neutral. One recent survey of State Bars in the United States on
complaints of lawyer sexual misconduct concluded that96% of the lawyers were male and 95%
of the complainants were female. (L.M. Jorgenson and P.K. Sutherland, "Lawyer/Client
Sexual Contact: State Bars Polled" (June 15, 1992), National Law Journal 26.) Therefore, for
the purposes of this paper, the masculine gender will be used to refer generally to lawyers and
the feminine genderwill be used when referring generally to complainants. Cf., where the same
approach was adopted, Y. Levy, "Attorneys, Clients and Sex: Conflicting Interests in the
California Rule' (1992), 5 Geo.J.L.Ethics 649, 650, at note 8.
2. L. Dubin, "Sex and theDivorceLawyer: Is theClient OffLimits?" (1988), 1 Geo.J.L.Ethics
585, at 586.
3. Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, Handbook on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsi-
bility (Halifax: Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, 1990). [Hereinafter, the Handbook].
4. Chapter 24: Sexual Relationships with a Client
Rule: A lawyer has a duty not to:
(a) initiate, request, suggest or engage in a sexual relationship with a client who is
emotionally vulnerable; or
(b) represent a client with whom the lawyer is having or has had a sexual relationship if
the lawyer's independent professional judgment is likely to be impaired because of such
a relationship.
Guiding Principles:
1. For purposes of the Rule, "sexual relationship" includes sexual intercourse between a
lawyer and client and any other conduct with a client which may reasonably be interpreted
as sexual.
2. For purposes of the Rule, if the client is an organization of body corporate, any
individual overseeing the representation and giving instructions to the lawyer shall be
deemed to be the client.
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ships with a Client.5 The purpose of this paper is to review the proposed
Rule in the context of a lawyer's fiduciary duty to his client.
Throughout North America, the profession has been challenged to
reconsider the boundaries of fiduciary duty by complaints of sexual
misconduct against lawyers.6 In Re MacDonald,7 a lawyer, who was
aware of his client's emotional vulnerability and nevertheless pursued
her sexually, was reprimanded by the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society for
3. Rule (a) does not apply to a sexual relationship between a lawyer and the lawyer's
spouse nor to a consensual sexual relationship which predates the initiation of the lawyer
client relationship.
4. The Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from engaging in a sexual relationship with a client
of that lawyer's firm provided that the lawyer has no involvement in the performance of
legal work for the client.
Commentary:
24.1 the reasons for the Rule are:
(a) to prohibit sexual exploitation in the course of a professional representation; and
(b) to ensure objective representation unimpaired by personal relationships.
24.2 Based upon the nature of the representation, a client may be emotionally vulnerable
and dependent upon the advice and guidance of the lawyer. In that regard, the lawyer has
the duty of utmost goodwill to the client.
24.3 The relationship between a lawyer and client is a fiduciary relationship of the very
highest character and all dealings between a lawyer and client that are beneficial to the
lawyer will be strictly scrutinized. Where a lawyer exercises undue influence over a client
or takes unfair advantage of a client, discipline is appropriate.
24.4 The Rule recognizes that emotional detachment from a client is necessary to the
lawyer's ability to provide competent legal services.
5. Although not yet adopted, henceforth the proposed rule will be referred to simply as
"Chapter 24". The Nova Scotia Barristers' Society is the only law society in Canada
considering an explicit rule on this matter. Chapter 24 was recommended by the province's
Legal Ethics Committee for consideration by the Executive, and requires final approval by the
Bar Society's Council to be formally adopted. (Interviews with Darryl Pink, Executive
Director Nova Scotia Bar Society and Alan J. Stem, Q.C., former Chair of the Legal Ethics
Committee, November, 1992 and November 1993 with Mr. Pink once again.)
6. Cf. L. Dubin, supra, note 2; Y. Levy., supra, note 1; Jorgenson and Sutherland., supra,
note 1.
7. Re MacDonald (June 19, 1991), Nova Scotia Barristers' Society.
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conduct unbecoming a member.' In its ruling, the Subcommittee held
that, since Mr. MacDonald knew that his client was "emotionally vulner-
able," he had an obligation to refrain from sexual relations with her. The
Subcommittee's assessment placed an emphasis on the client's peculiar
vulnerability, not the lawyer's professional responsibility.
The decision leaves many questions unanswered. Had the client not
been uniquely fragile, would the lawyer's sexual pursuit of that client
been any less a breach of his duty? If, by the very nature of a fiduciary
relationship a lawyer accepts the confidence of his client, with the ethical
obligation not to misuse that trust, should not the assessment of an alleged
breach focus on the actions of the lawyer? In the more traditional context
of fiduciary duty that is the nature of the investigation. The rules
surrounding business related conflicts reflect, as the primary concern of
the profession, the protection of the client.9 How is a breach of a more
personal nature different?
8. Mr. MacDonald was retained by the complainant in June, 1988, regarding an employment
matter, after she was referred to him by her psychiatrist. Since 1982, the complainant had been
treated for severe reactive depression by the psychiatrist, mainly precipitated by a stressful,
long-term relationship with a colleague at work. Her treatment included a prescription for
Nardil, an anti-depressant, which improved her mental state "markedly". The psychiatrist
advised Mr. MacDonald of the complainant's condition in 1988. The complainant provided
Mr. MacDonald with a written history of her problems with her employer in February of 1989,
which included a description of difficulties, such as her 1982 nervous breakdown, her feelings
of betrayal by men and her low self-esteem.
At Mr. MacDonald's request, the complainant met him at 7:30 pm at O'Carroll's Restaurant
in Halifax, on March 1, 1989, where both legal and non-legal matters were discussed. At Mr.
MacDonald's initiation in following-up on her file, he and the complainant had several lengthy
telephone conversations, during which the discussion became "quite personal in nature." The
complainant was concerned about the fees for Mr. MacDonald's lengthy phone calls, and was
told by Mr. MacDonald, "Don't worry about it... .[There are some things] you have to do."
On April 2, 1989, Mr. MacDonald called the complainant in the evening to invite her out for
pizza with him and his son, which she declined. After spending the evening becoming
intoxicated, Mr. MacDonald fell asleep, awaking at about 1:00 am, at which point he called the
complainant. Mr. MacDonald states that he was invited by her to come to her home, and upon
arriving he could smell alcohol on her breath and noted she had a "bit of a buzz on." The parties
engaged in intimate sexual conduct, although the complainant's only recollection of the affair
is a brief vision during the act and her requesting that he discontinue. Allegations by the
complainant that Mr. MacDonald had exerted force against her, that she was not a willing
participant, were not accepted by the Subcommittee. In the morning, the complainant was
surprised that Mr. MacDonald was inherbedroom, and he immediately left. At the intervention
of concerned friends, who became aware of her despondency over the incident, and her
resulting attempted suicide, the complainant was hospitalized on April 4.
On April 12, 1990, the complainant first filed a letter of complaint with the Bar Society.
9. For example, Regulation 48C regarding loans between lawyer and client, places the
burden of proof on the lawyer to show that the client's interests were fully protected by
independent legal advice. Notices, "Loans Between Solicitors and Clients" (February, 1992),
1 Discipline Digest 2 (Nova Scotia Barristers' Society).
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Logically, no ethical distinction can be made between a lawyer's
misuse of his client's financial trust on the one hand, and a lawyer's
misuse of his client's personal trust on the other. When a lawyer has a
sexual relationship with a client, he calls into question whether he is
placing his own interests ahead of those of his client, and whether he is
taking advantage of the unique vulnerability of a client, as a client.
Insofar as the Rule in Chapter 24 proposes to adopt the approach in Re
MacDonald, by prohibiting a lawyer from having a sexual relationship
with clients who are "emotionally vulnerable", it is inconsistent with the
standards of fiduciary duty in other contexts. In its adherence to an
illusory distinction, the proposed Rule would shift the assessment of a
complaint of professional misconduct away from the lawyer and focus
the inquiry on the degree of the client's vulnerability. In practical terms,
this Rule would place the lawyer in the extraordinary position of having
to assess, perhaps in the midst of an ethical dilemma, whether the client
fits the ambiguous, and undefined, label of "emotionally vulnerable".
Amendments to Chapter 24 that will make the Rule more consistent
with fiduciary duty, as enunciated in the other relevant sections of the
Handbook, are in order. Prior to outlining an alternative Chapter 24,
Section I of this paper explores the extent of the problem of lawyer -client
sexual relations, and the manner in which other jurisdictions and compa-
rable professions have dealt with the issue. Section II considers the nature
of a lawyer's fiduciary obligations to his client, and it compares the duty
in business and personal relations. Section I focuses on Chapter 24,
providing a critique of it in the context of fiduciary theory. The conclusion
outlines the logic behind an alternative Rule, which is then appended.
In adopting an explicit Rule on lawyer - client sexual relations, the
Barristers' Society must avoid tacitly approving lawyer transgressions
despite its desire to respect the privacy concerns of lawyers, and must
establish a Rule which discourages complainants from coming forward
by making their emotional state the threshold issue of an investigation.
The Barristers' Society would better serve the public and its members
with a clear Rule, consistent with the existing Rules governing the
fiduciary duty of lawyers in other contexts.
I. Is there a Problem with Lawyer- Client Sexual Relations?
It has become apparent that the profession needs a clear and practical Rule
regarding a lawyer's personal relations with a client. Over the last three
years in Nova Scotia, four separate complaints arising out of incidents of
sexual relations between lawyers and their clients have been investigated
by the Barristers' Society: two complaints led to the member being
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cautioned at the investigative stage,10 another is proceeding to a Formal
Hearing," and the other received a Formal Hearing. 2
A survey of State Bars in the United States concluded that at least 90
complaints of sexual misconduct by lawyers had been filed in the two
years preceding the spring 1992 study.13 However, not one jurisdiction in
North America has explicitly adopted an ethical Rule of professional
conduct prohibiting or restricting lawyer -client sexual relations. Appar-
ently, about half of the U.S. State Bar Associations believe such a Rule
is unnecessary, and the other half remain undecided, or favour such a
Rule. 4 A number of jurisdictions in North America have recently
considered the adoption of an explicit Rule, 5 and California became the
first to do so in 1992.16
In California, after high profile divorce lawyer Marvin Mitchelson was
accused by two former clients of sexual assault, State Assemblywoman
Roybal-Allard sponsored a bill which would require the State Bar to
regulate, as a matter of professional conduct, lawyer - client sexual
relations. 17 In the process, a debate ensued within and without the
profession about the "L.A. Law" like behaviour of some of its
membership.' 8
10. Investigative Committee Dispositions, "No. 2: Sexual Relationship with Client" (Febru-
ary, 1992), 1 Discipline Digest 5. A member was cautioned by Discipline Subcommittee "B"
for continuing to represent a client in divorce proceedings after having had a brief sexual
relationship with her. The complaint was made by the client's ex-husband. Investigative
Committee Dispositions, "No.12: Cautioned Member" (1993), 6 Discipline Digest 4.
11. Interview with Darryl Pink, Executive Director, Nova Scotia Barristers' Society (No-
vember, 1993).
12. In Re MacDonald, supra, note 7.
13. Only thirty-two of the fifty State BarAssociations responded to that question; Jorgenson
and Sutherland, supra, note 1 at 32.
14. "Regulation of Lawyer - Client Sexual Contact: How Far Should the Profession Go?",
National Organization of Bar Counsel (USA), Annual Meeting Report (August, 1992).
[Hereinafter, the "NOBC - USA"]
15. They are California, Michigan, Illinois, Oregon and Nova Scotia; ibid.
16. Joanne Pitulla, "Unfair Advantage," (November 1992) ABA Journal 76. In Formal
Opinion 92-364, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
declared that a sexual relationship between a lawyer and client may violate the ABA Moral
Rules of Professional Conduct, ibid., at 79.
17. Levy, supra, note 1 at 651; Memorandum and Supporting Documents in Explanation of
Proposed Rule 3-120 of the Rules of Professional Misconduct, California State Bar to the
California Supreme Court (May, 1991).
18. "Lawyer - Client Sex May be Banned by State Bar" (January 21, 1991), L.A. Times;
Memorandum from the State Bar of California to the Supreme Court of California (January 9,
1992): "Subject Matter Summary of Written Public Comment on Republished California Rule
of Professional Conduct 3-120 (Sexual Relations With Client)." Cf. Cornelia H. Tuite, "Re
Arnie Becker" (March, 1991), A.B.A.J. 88.
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Three other jurisdictions in the United States have considered similar
Rules: 19 Michigan and Illinois have a draft Rule; Oregon's State Bar
rejected a proposed Rule in October 1991.20 Alaska and Maryland have
opted for providing "advisory opinions" from their Bar Associations'
Ethics Committees, and both States' Legal Ethics Committees advise
against sexual relations with clients in light of the adverse effect such a
relationship might have on the lawyer's ability to protect the client's
interests.
21
In Canada, less has apparently been done and little has been docu-
mented. The Law Society of Alberta "supplemented" their existing Rules
of conduct with a decision to reprimand a lawyer for "act[ing] crudely"
by inviting a client to spend an afternoon with him in a hotel room.2 The
Law Society of Upper Canada Benchers reprimanded a member for
unbecoming conduct, after two former divorce clients complained of the
lawyer's unsolicited sexual advances, and a third former client, for whom
he acted on a matrimonial matter, complained to the lawyer's former
partner of his sexual pursuit (and her regretful acquiescence)Y
The Ontario Bar has acted to deal with the related problem of
workplace sexual harassment,24 and passed a Rule of professional con-
duct regarding sexual harassment by members. Rule 27 states:
Sexual harassment of a colleague, of staff, of clients, or of other persons,
in a professional context, is professional misconduct2
19. NOBC-USA, supra, note 14.
20. L.M. Jorgenson and P.K. Sutherland, "Fiduciary Theory Applied to Personal Dealings:
Attorney-Client Sexual Contact" (1992), 45 Ark.L.R. 459, at 460-461.
21. Ibid., at461-462.
22. NOBC-USA, supra, note 14 at 7.
23. In Re Zuker (October 17, 1989), Law Society of Upper Canada, Discipline Committee.
Since 1991, when the L.S.U.C. began to specifically compile the data, an estimated 30
investigations into "sexual misconsduct" of lawyers have occurred. ("Sexual misconduct"
includes complaints related to sexual assault by lawyers, at one extreme, to ostensibly
consensual sexual relations, at the other.) Of these, 10 to 15 complaints were made by former
clients and involved circumstances which may be described as ostensibly consensual relations
between the client and her lawyer. (Interview with Scott Kerr, Complaints Department,
L.S.U.C., November 18, 1993).
24. "A Recommended Personnel Policy Regarding Employment - Related Sexual Harass-
ment" (January 24, 1992), Law Society of Upper Canada.
25. "New Sexual Harassment Rule" (September, 1992), 2 The Advisor 1:1 (The Practice
Advisory Service, Law Society of Upper Canada).
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In the Commentary, the Rule's reach to certain kinds of lawyer - client
sexual relations is suggested:
1. Sexual harassment is defined as one or a series of incidents involving
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favours, or other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature
(i) when such conductmight reasonably be expected to cause insecurity,
discomfort, offence or humiliation to another person or group; or
(ii) when submission to such conduct is made implicitly or explicitly a
condition for the provision of professional services;...
With Rule 27, the Law Society of Upper Canada has chosen not to deal
directly with the question of fiduciary duty. Whether that duty is compro-
mised, or even affected, by a lawyer's intimacy with a client, regardless
of whether the client "consents" to that relationship, remains unanswered
in Ontario. Rule 27 focuses on unwelcome sexual harassment, not lawyer
- client sexual relations.
Other professions, particularly in the medical world, have confronted
the problem and the Government of Ontario has recently proposed the
Regulated Health Professions Act in an effort to prohibit all forms of
doctor - patient sexual contact.26 In the United States, high profile
revelations of doctor - patient sexual relations in the field of psycho-
therapy has touched off a debate that invokes the teachings, and actions,
of Freud and has led to civil actions by former patients against the
offending therapists. 7
Their have been several academic attempts to draw analogies between
the professions, raising ethical implications for lawyer - client sexual
relations. 28 The effect of a divorce lawyer's role upon an emotionally
26. "Taking Action Against Sexual Abuse of Patients" (October, 1992), Ontario Govern-
ment (Ministry of Health). The proposed Act (the "RHPA") would specifically define forms
of sexual misconduct and attach penalties for the degree of the offence. "Sexual impropriety"
includes behaviour or remarks that are sexually demeaning, and which may cause the
profession to reprimand or suspend the offending doctor. "Sexual transgression" deals with
touching and kissing, and may attract penalties ranging from a reprimand to a licence
revocation plus a fine. "Sexual violation" (patient-physician sex) includes, but is not limited
to, sexual intercourse and may be penalized by mandatory licence revocation for a minimum
of five years plus a $20,000 fine. The RHPA results from a report of an independent task force,
set up by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, in response to complaints from
patients and patients' groups. Members'Dialogue (July, 1991: #7), College of Physicians and
Surgeons of Ontario.
27. "Sex and Psychotherapy: Doctors Sleeping with Patients - A Growing Crisis of Ethical
Abuse" (April 19, 1992), Newsveek, at 53.
28. Dubin, supra, note 2 at 605; Jogenson and Sutherland, supra, note 20.
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distraught client has been compared to that of the psychotherapist's effect
on his patient, including the phenomenon of "transference" and the
related power imbalance that occurs.29 As well, and along with parent -
child, doctor - patient, clergy - penitent, professor - student and employer
-employee relationships, it has been argued that the lawyer - client sexual
relationship must be assessed in the context of "power dependency."
There is a presumption of exploitation by the person in the power
position, thereby rendering the defence of consent in these circumstances
legally ineffective. 0
These concepts were not ignored by the Subcommittee in Re
MacDonald, when it held:
Under the heading "The Concept of Transference" Professor Dubin
writes:...
The urge to act [upon the sexual attraction the lawyer feels for the client]
needs to be controlled in order for the lawyer to remain a competent
professional, working toward the best interest of his client.
While Mr. MacDonald was not acting as a divorce lawyer for the com-
plainant, the professional activity, as a consequence of the grievance of the
complainant, and the continuing distress under which she suffered, dealt
with matters of very considerable emotional and sexual intimacy between
herself and other men.
3'
While some obvious distinctions may be drawn between professional
relationships, particularly between those in the fields of medicine and
law, the Subcommittee's observation served to underline the common
fiduciary duty to not misuse the position of trust in which the lawyer, or
other professional, has been placed.
29. In psychoanalysis, transference occurs when the patient "directs towards the physician
a degree of affectionate feeling.. .which is based on no real relation between them and which
-as is shown by every detail of its emergence- can only be traced back to old wishful phantacies
of the patient's which have become unconscious." Thomas Lyon, "Sexual Exploitation of
Divorce Clients: The Lawyer's Prerogative?" (1987), 10 Harv. Women's L.J. 159, at 163, in
part quoting from S. Freud, Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1909).
30. Phyllis Coleman, "Sex in Power Dependency Relationships: Taking Unfair Advantage
of the "Fair" Sex" (1988), 53 Alb.L.R. 95, at 96.
31. Re MacDonald, supra, note 7 at 31.
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II. The Lawyer as a Fiduciary
The attorney stands in a fiduciary relationship with the client and should
exercise professional judgement "solely for the benefit of the client and
free of compromising influences and loyalties."...By making unsolicited
sexual advances to a client, an attorney perverts the very essence of the
lawyer-client relationship. Such egregious conduct most certainly war-
rants discipline."32
It is not universally accepted that the fiduciary duty of a lawyer to a client
extends to personal relationships. Contrasting the views expressed in Re
Gibson, an Illinois court concluded that further effects on the professional
relationship must result from the personal relations before a breach
occurs:
An attorney, just like the client, is at best and at worst, a human being
fraught with all the frailties that the status entails. For this reason we do not
believe that the higher standard of care required of a fiduciary should
extend to an attorney's personal relationship with his clients, unless there
is tangible evidence that the attorney actually made his professional
services contingent upon the sexual involvement or that his legal represen-
tation of the client was, in fact, adversely affected.33
In the one Formal Hearing decision in Nova Scotia, Re MacDonald,
34
the Discipline Subcommittee seemed to walk the line between these two
views. On the one hand, the Subcommittee quoted extensively from an
article by ProfessorDubin, which concludes that"a lawyeris not ethically
free to pursue sexual relations with clients" because of the lawyer's status
of fiduciary to the client.35 On the other hand, the Subcommittee explicitly
refused to "determine the vexing problem as to whether sexual relations
per se between a solicitor and client constitute conduct unbecoming",
focusing instead on "the circumstances of this case."36 As noted, those
circumstances included a client whose ill health, andrelated fragility, was
such thatthe Subcommittee could fimd conduct unbecoming ofamember,
without directly ruling on the whether the lawyer's conduct itself,
regardless of the client's peculiarities, was a breach of his fiduciary duty
32. Re Gibson (1985), 369 N.W.2d 466, 695, 699, 700, as quoted in NOBC-USA, supra,
note 14.
33. Suppressed v. Suppressed (1990), 565 N.E.2d 101, 105 (Il.Ct.App.) [Hereinafter
Suppressed], as quoted inNOBC-USA, supra, note 14. These two quotes, from Suppressed and
Gibson, were placed in contrast in NOBC-USA.
34. Re MacDonald, supra, note 7.
35. Dubin, supra, note 2 at 586 as quoted in Re MacDonald, supra, note 7 at 29-30.
36. Re MacDonald, supra, note 7 at 32 (emphasis added).
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to that client. In Re MacDonald, in other words, the implicating circum-
stances that were required by the court in Suppressed, in order to find a
breach, were present. The necessity of such special fragility on the part
of the client is questioned by Professor Dubin:
The fiduciary obligation to a client, which increases the lawyer's respon-
sibilities beyond mere contractual performance, can be justified on the
ground that a client is vulnerable and not able to evaluate the quality of a
lawyer's performance. However, even absent clientvulnerability, a lawyer's
fiduciary obligation should not be lessened.37
It is essential, therefore, to determine the nature of the lawyer's
fiduciary duty, in order to assess how, or whether, it extends to a lawyer's
personal relations with a client. The Preface to the Canadian Bar
Association's Code of Professional Conduct states that a lawyer "must
act at all times uberrimaefidei.35 Is that good faith breached by a sexual
relationship with a client?
It has been said that the House of Lords decision in Nocton v. Lord
Ashburton39 is the "leading decision with respect to the fiduciary duty of
a solicitor."40 Not so long ago, the B.C. Court of Appeal, in Jacks v.
Davis, 41 applied Nocton, and "expanded the extent of a lawyer's liability
for breach of fiduciary duty:"42
Viscount Haldane indicated that in order to determine whether a fiduciary
relationship existed which would give rise to the solicitor being under a
special duty to make full disclosure depended upon the circumstances and
relations of the parties. But it is clear from that decision that such a
relationship arises when the solicitor-client relationship exists. The reason
it arises is that the client is reposing confidence in the solicitor and the
solicitor is obliged to make full disclosure to the client in order that the
client may properly make decisions in respect of the matter upon which he
is retaining the solicitor.3
Professor Wolfram has explained that the lawyer's fiduciary duty is
not only founded on the client's confidence in her lawyer, but also arises
out of the fact that the client is "relatively vulnerable because of inferior
37. Dubin, supra, note 2 at 592 (emphasis added).
38. Code of Professional Conduct (Toronto: Canadian Bar Association, August, 1987),
Preface.
39. [1914] A.C. 932.
40. John Sopinka, "Professional Responsibility of Lawyers at Common Law", in Meredith
Memorial Lectures 1983-84 (Don Mills: DeBoo Publishers, 1985), 247-269.
41. [1980] 6W.W.R. 11.
42. Sopinka, supra, note 40.
43. As quoted in Sopinka, ibid.
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legal information and skills and because of the pressure of legal difficul-
ties."44 As well, it has been pointed out that a lawyer with a particular self-
interest has difficulty acting as an impartial fiduciary on that matter.
Sopinka has noted that:
... [t]ypically, breach of fiduciary obligations occur where a lawyer has
acted for both sides or has a personal interest in the transaction. The
solicitor in both situations owes a duty of disclosure to his client and will
be liable for any damage if he breaches this duty whether or not the fact of
non-disclosure was the actual cause of the damage .... A solicitor is in
breach of his fiduciary duty if he acts in any case or matter in which his
interest and duty conflict 4
Conflict of interest rules, therefore, arise out of the profession's
concern that a lawyer may unintentionally, or otherwise, breach his
fiduciary duty. Whether in regard to "client - client" conflict, where a
lawyer acts for both sides of a matter, or "lawyer -client" conflict, where
the lawyer has a self-interest in the file, the rules of professional conduct
direct a lawyer to avoid a transgression. If a lawyer has a personal interest
in the client, arising out of a sexual relationship with that client, a "lawyer
- client" conflict may occur if the lawyer's interest and his duty conflict.
On a divorce matter, for example, a lawyer's personal interest in the client
may conflict with his statutory duty to advise the client on the means of
marital reconciliation.46
The extent to which a lawyer must go to avoid even the possibility of
such a conflict was recently underlined by the Supreme Court of Canada,
in Martin v. Gray. Noting that a "lawyer cannot compartmentalize his or
her mind," Sopinka I. held that, where a previous, sufficiently related
relationship between the lawyer and the opposing client is found, a
rebuttable presumption of a conflict will arise.47 The English courts'
standard for finding a conflict, which requires showing there is a "prob-
ability of mischief' or the likelihood of detrimental disclosure by the
lawyer of truly confidential information, 4 was rejected by Sopinka J. in
favour of a stricter approach, which may be paraphrased as the "reason-
able possibility of a conflict" standard.
44. C.Wolfram, ModernLegalEthics(1986), at 147, note20, as quoted in Dubin, supra, note
2 at 592.
45. Sopinka, supra, note 40.
46. Divorce Act, S.C. 1986, c.4, ss.9(1) and 9(2).
47. MacDonald Estate v. Martin (sub. nom. Martin v. Gray) (1990), 77 D.L.R. (4th) 249
(S.C.C.), at 268.
48. Rakusen v. Ellis, Munday, and Clarke, in Martin v. Gray, ibid.
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Similarly, when a lawyer benefits at the expense of the client, "a
presumption arises that the fiduciary exercised undue influence":
49
Such a benefit is presumptively void, and the burden shifts to the fiduciary
to show that the benefit was not awarded as a result of an abuse of the
relationship. To do this, the fiduciary must show that there was fair and full
disclosure to the client of the benefit to the fiduciary and that the
transaction did not disadvantage or harm the client.50
A rebuttable presumption of undue influence is imposed upon the
fiduciary because, by the very nature of the relationship, transgressions
by the fiduciary are difficult to detect. 1 Furthermore, as SopinkaJ. noted,
consideration for the effect on the profession from the perspective of the
"reasonable member of the public" must also be factored into the
development of measures to prevent conflicts.
5 2
The fiduciary relationship between lawyer and client arises out of the
trust and confidence the client reposes in the lawyer. In order to protect
the client, who by the nature of that relationship is vulnerable, the lawyer
accepts the duty to place the client's interests ahead of his own and to act
impartially on that client's behalf. Where it is reasonably possible that the
lawyer is or has been unable to fulfil his obligations in that regard, a
rebuttable presumption that the lawyer exercised undue influence or has
entered into a conflict arises.
The "reasonable measures" expected of the lawyer to rebut this
presumption depend, to some extent, on the circumstances, but are
consistent in their requirement that the lawyer show that the client's
interests were, in fact, protected to the best of the lawyer's abilities. In a
"client - client" conflict, reasonable measures may entail a "chinese wall
or cone of silence" in the firm to prevent the breach of confidential client
information. 3 Or, where a lawyer is entering into a business relationship
with the client, it is required that the lawyer recommend to the client that
she seek independent legal advice and ensure that she receives a full and
understandable disclosure of the terms of the transaction.5 4 By first
obtaining, in this way, the client's informed consent prior to the transac-
49. Jorgenson and Sutherland, supra, note 20 at 485.
50. Ibid., at 486.
51. Ibid., at 488.
52. Martin v. Gray, supra, note 47 at 267.
53. Ibid., at 269.
54. Chapter 7, Handbook on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, supra, note 3.
[Hereinafter, "Chapter"]
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tion, the lawyer is affirming that the client's interests are protected, and
that her susceptibility to exploitation is being avoided.
The Nova Scotia Handbook provides a number of other Rules of
guidance which are directed to protecting the client's trust and confidence
in the profession. A lawyer has a duty not to acquire property by way of
gift or testamentary disposition unless the client has independent legal
advice.5 A lawyer has a duty not to prepare an instrument giving the
lawyer a substantial gift from the client, including a testamentary gift
(although, rather inconsistently, that lawyer's partner or associate can
prepare such an instrument).56 A lawyer cannot advise his co-venturers in
respect of legal matters between them.
5 7
In accordance with the decision in Martin v. Gray, the Nova Scotia
Handbook states that a lawyer has a duty to uphold, in the strictest of
confidence, all client business and personal information which arises out
of the lawyer - client relationship:
The fiduciary relationship between lawyer and client forbids the lawyer to
use any confidential information acquired by the lawyer as a result of the
professional relationship for the benefit of the lawyer or a third person, or
to the advantage of the client.58
The business side of the relationship between lawyer and fee paying
client must also fit within the rubric of the fiduciary relationship:59
The fiduciary aspect of the relationship that exists between lawyer and
client requires full disclosure of all financial matters between them and
prohibits a lawyer from accepting any hidden fees.60
Similar cautions are provided regarding a lawyer's outside interests. The
Handbook states that a lawyer's involvement in other interests cannot be
allowed "to impair the exercise of the lawyer's independent professional
judgement on behalf of a client."61 A client's affairs are said to require
impartiality and must be free from a lawyer's conflicting interests:
...the client's affairs may be seriously prejudiced unless the lawyer's
judgement and freedom of action on the client's behalf are as free as
possible from compromising influences .... The Rule requires informed
consent to enable the client to make an informed decision about whether






59. Dubin, supra, note 2 at 591.
60. Chapter 12.6.
61. Chapter 8.1, 8.2.
62. Chapter 6.1, 6.2 (emphasis added).
A Conflict is a Conflict is a Conflict
As well, a lawyer has a duty not to borrow from or lend money to a
client,63 except where the client is in the business of lending and/or
borrowing money or is fully protected by independent legal advice,64 and
where the lawyer is able to discharge the onus by proving that the client's
interests were fully protected.
6 1
In the decision of the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society Discipline
Subcommittee in Re Goldberg,66 this prescription against loans to clients
was at issue, and the Subcommittee's findings on the matter are helpful
to understanding the way in which the profession applies these fiduciary
Rules. Mr. Goldberg, a partner in a Halifax finm, lent money to and
became active in the operations of a client company. The Subcommittee
held that Mr. Goldberg failed in his obligation to the client by not insisting
that the company have independent legal advice, and thereby became
fully informed of any "actual, perceived or potential conflicts of inter-
est."67 At issue was the behaviour of Mr. Goldberg, who jeopardized his
independence and integrity by becoming both investor and lawyer to the
company. The Subcommittee issued a reprimand to Mr. Goldberg and
ordered him to pay costs.
In contrast, while the Discipline Committee in Re MacDonald did
assess the behaviour of Mr. MacDonald in the context of fiduciary duties,
it focused in the end on the peculiar fragility of the client in these
circumstances and the attendant duty upon Mr. MacDonald to consider
her related best interests. The decision to reprimand Mr. MacDonald was
founded on the conclusion that, while the lawyer - client relationship
continued and his representation of her was not apparently affected, his
failure to consider the effect of his actions on the complainant in her
emotional state constituted an oversight of his client's best interests.6s
The Subcommittee held that the lengthy phone calls between
MacDonald and the complainant "entered into the personal field," but
that the incident of sexual intimacy between them was "not related to the
solicitor - client relationship." 69 Yet, the Subcommittee also held that the
"opportunity" to engage in "conversation and acts that were pleasing and
satisfactory to him, but.. .profoundly upsetting, and potentially very
harmful to her," arose as a consequence of the lawyer- client relationship.7"
63. Chapter 7(g).
64. Regulation 48C(1).
65. Notices, 1 Discipline Digest 1,2, Nova Scotia Barristers' Society (February 1992).
66. (1991), Nova Scotia Barristers' Society.
67. Supra, note 65 at 4.
68. Re MacDonald, supra, note 7 at 35, 37-38.
69. Ibid., at 35.
70. Ibid., at 37.
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Indeed, the Subcommittee held that Mr. MacDonald's actions "consti-
tuted a fundamental breach of his obligation to her [the complainant, his
client]." 71 How, on the one hand, the Subcommittee could find the sexual
relationship was not related to, but on the other hand arose out of, the
lawyer - client relationship is difficult to reconcile.
2
In finding as they did, however, the Committee chose not to hold Mr.
MacDonald to the same standard as Mr. Goldberg: by becoming both
lawyer and sexual pursuer, had not Mr. MacDonald jeopardized his
independence and integrity?; had not Mr. MacDonald failed his client by
not ensuring that she provided informed consent, -fully aware of the
actual, perceived or potential conflict of interest which might occur as a
result of Mr. MacDonald's personal interest, and the effective compro-
mising of his ability to fulfil his professional duty?
A real concern arises out of the Subcommittee's focus on the
complainant's emotional state. While in this instance the fragility of the
complainant created in the lawyer a special duty of care, her emotional
state appears to have also placed into doubt her testimony before the
Subcommittee. The Subcommittee concluded:
The Committee concludes that the evidence of Mr. MacDonald with
respect to [the events of February to April, 19891 is more reliable and, for
the most part, his evidence should be accepted. In part, this was due to the
complainant's taking an excessive amount of medication, being emotion-
ally upset, mixing her medication with a small amount of wine, and
suffering from a medical condition which may have caused amnesia with
respect to conduct of certain kinds.73
Thus, the very state of the client's vulnerability that created the special
duty of care in Mr. MacDonald, and which was necessarily argued by the
Barristers' Society counsel to succeed in establishing that a breach
occurred, was also cause for mitigating the degree of the transgression.
71. Supra, note 70 (emphasis added).
72. By way of contrast, in Drucker's Case (1990), 577 A.2d 1198 (N.H.S.C.), a lawyer's
two-year suspension was upheld, despite the fact that there was no finding that his independent
professional judgement had been effected. The court found that Drucker failed to maintain an
ethical lawyer-client relationship, when he initiated a sexual relationship with a divorce client
after she had told him that she was seeing a psychiatrist and was emotionally fragile. It was
concluded that the client became unable to separate her personal feelings from her confidence
in him as her lawyer. It was held that the lawyer knew or should have known that his client
would suffer emotionally as a consequence of his actions. (See discussion in Jorgenson and
Sutherland, supra, note 20 at 479).
73. Re MacDonald, supra, note 7 at 26.
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The question, therefore, remains: if the client company's decision not
to get independent legal advice was not at issue in Re Goldberg,74 but
rather, it was the fact that Mr. Goldberg had not insisted that it do so which
breached his fiduciary duty, why was it necessary to question the female
complainant's state of mind and emotional vulnerability before assessing
the lawyer's (fiduciary's) behaviour in Re MacDonald?
III. Chapter 24 of the Nova Scotia Handbook
It is unfortunate that the Legal Ethics Committee of the Nova Scotia
Banisters' Society chose to limit the proposed regulation of lawyer -
client sexual relations to incidents between lawyers and "emotionally
vulnerable" clients. Measured against the fiduciary duty a lawyer has to
his client, this and other aspects of the proposed Rule fall short of the
necessary standards of conduct expected of a professional with a client's
trust to protect. The proposed Rule in Chapter 24 states:
Rule: A lawyer has a duty not to: (a) initiate, request, suggest or engage in
a sexual relationship with client who is emotionally vulnerable; or (b)
represent a client with whom the lawyer is having or has had a sexual
relationship if the lawyer's independent professional judgement is likely
to be impaired because of such a relationship.
71
Chapter 24 is inconsistent with the implementation of a lawyer's fidu-
ciary duty in the rest of the Nova Scotia Handbook. It tacitly approves of
sexual relations between lawyers and clients where a client is not
extraordinarily vulnerable. It may discourage complainants from coming
forward, and it is impractical in its disregard for detection problems
associated with fiduciary relationships.
As noted previously, the Rule places complainants in the uncomfort-
able and contradictory position of having to convince the Discipline
Subcommittee that, while they were quite emotionally unstable at the
time of the relationship, they are nevertheless credible complainants with
respect to their recollection of the facts at issue now before the Subcom-
mittee. The practical effect of this approach may be to discourage
complainants from coming forward. It may also make detection more
difficult, since the category of client that is explicitly protected is a vague,
undefined one and no doubt particularly difficult for the lawyer to assess
in the "heat of the moment." It will certainly focus attention away from
the lawyer's behaviour and on to the complainant's credibility.
74. Discipline Digest, supra, note 66.
75. Chapter 24, Handbook, supra, note 3 (emphasis added).
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In the context of the Rules applied in Re MacDonald, the Subcommit-
tee held that counsel for the Society was not under an obligation to call
expert evidence to establish that the objective standard applied to such
questions of conduct.76 One wonders whether, within the rubric of the
proposed Rule, it will be necessary to establish that the client was, in fact,
"emotionally vulnerable" at the time of the intimacy, and if so, whether
expert evidence will be required from both parties to the complaint.
The Commentary of the proposed Rule does not help to answer these
concerns, but only serves to confuse further. It is stated in Commentary
24.1 that the Rule is intended to prohibit sexual exploitation and ensure
objective representation, unimpaired by personal relationships. How a
lawyer can have a sexual relationship with a "regularly" (as opposed to
an "emotionally") vulnerable client, and remain objective in his represen-
tation is not explained, and, with due respect, somewhat difficult to
accept. As Sopinka J. pointed out in Martin v. Gray, a lawyer cannot
"compartmentalize his mind. '77 Whether or not the client has a peculiar
vulnerability does not affect the fact that the lawyer has a personal interest
in the client. An interest of a personal nature is, by definition, subjective.
Commentary 24.2 notes that, "based on the nature of the representa-
tion, a client may be emotionally vulnerable." In addition, Commentary
24.3 notes that the nature of the relationship between lawyer and client is
a fiduciary one, thus beneficial dealings with the client will be strictly
scrutinized for evidence of undue influence. Once again, the Rule and the
Commentary appear to be inconsistent. If, by the nature of the represen-
tation, all clients may be "emotionally vulnerable", and the lawyer -client
relationship is a fiduciary one, then would not the Rule prohibiting sexual
relations between a lawyer and an "emotionally vulnerable" client, in
effect, be a Rule prohibiting sexual relations with all clients?
On the other hand, while the Commentary suggests that the purpose of
the Rule is to honour the fiduciary duty a lawyer has to his client, the Rule
formally limits itself to the protection of a narrower band of clientele,
namely those who are "emotionally vulnerable". It is, therefore, difficult
to tell if the Rule tacitly approves of sexual relations between lawyers and
clients who are not "emotionally vulnerable", or if it effectively prohibits
sexual relations with all clients, since all clients, in the context of a
fiduciary relationship, are "emotionally vulnerable". Without a defini-
tion of what is meant by "emotionally vulnerable", and how such a client
is identifiably different from other clients, it is possible in this way to
76. Re MacDonald, supra, note 7 at 34.
77. Supra, note 47.
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interpret an absolute prohibition of lawyer - client sexual relations in
Chapter 24, although that is not the stated objective of the Legal Ethics
Committee.
The test of any Rule is its application. It is uncertain how Chapter 24
would apply to real circumstances facing lawyers in practice. As noted
above, the Divorce Act establishes that lawyers have a duty to "draw to
the attention of' and "inform" the client of the object and means of
achieving reconciliation with their spouse, rather than divorce. 7 Where
a lawyer becomes intimately involved with a client in a divorce matter,
the extent to which he fulfils this duty may become suspect. Indeed,
applying Sopinka J.'s test79, sexual relations between a lawyer and
divorce client would always be a breach of the lawyer's fiduciary duty,
since the lawyer's personal interest would possibly conflict with his
professional duty, as defined by the Divorce Act.
Under Chapter 24, if the lawyer's "independent professional judg-
ment" is "impaired", the Rule would be breached. The nature of the
fiduciary duty, as emphasised in the Commentary section, requires
lawyers to avoid even the possibility of a conflict of interest. While
lawyers may believe that they are fulfilling their professional obligations,
their intimacies with clients may have impaired their judgment without
their being aware of that impairment. In the context of a business conflict,
the Rules avoid this kind of self-analysis by simply requiring the lawyer
to insist upon the client's obtaining independent legal advice.
Chapter 24 can be further tested in a corporate law context. A client
who approaches a lawyer for a simple incorporation may, at first, appear
not to be the kind of client that is "off limits" by the proposed Rule. The
legal matter is not emotionally charged, and the client would likely appear
to be a business professional, as strong and independent as the lawyer, and
outwardly not emotionally vulnerable. But, it is unclear whether the
proposed Rule would prohibit the lawyer and this client from becoming
intimate. While the client may not appear to be emotionally vulnerable,
the Commentary notes that the very nature of the representation may
make the client emotionally vulnerable. As Wolfram notes, a client's
reliance on a lawyer in the intimidating environment of the legal system,
to which she is not accustomed, creates a natural anxiety in the client8 0
In addition, the Commentary reminds the lawyer that the relationship
is a fiduciary one, and under those circumstances the mere possibility of
78. Supra, note 46 at ss. 9(1), (2) and (3).
79. Sopinka, supra, note 40.
80. Wolfram, supra, note 44.
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a conflict is enough to require the lawyer to obtain the client's informed
consent. Thus, Chapter 24 is not clear in that the Commentary appears to
explain that the rule prohibits sexual relations with this corporate client,
perse, while it also seems that the rule would only prohibit such relations
with this client if she was "emotionally vulnerable". Once again, what is
meant by emotionally vulnerable is not clear, remains undefined, and
seems to be an impractical attempt to distinguish particularly vulnerable
clients from not-so-particularly vulnerable clients. How the lawyer is
qualified or capable of recognizing that distinction is not explained, and
difficult to accept.
By way of contrast, California's Rule 3-120 attempts to take into
account these kinds of concerns." Rule 3-120 prohibits sexual relations
between a lawyer and client which is "incident to or as a condition of
professional representation", and it explicitly restricts lawyers from
using "undue influence" to entice a client into sexual relations. Paragraph
B prohibits relations between a lawyer and client where "such sexual
relations cause the member to perform legal services incompetently."
At the final draft stage, the Rule included an evidentiary, rebuttable
presumption to overcome the enforcement obstacles which arise because
of the difficulty in detecting transgressions:
(E) A member who engages in sexual relations with his or her client will
be presumed to violate rule 3-120, paragraph (B)(3). This presumption
shall only be used as a presumption affecting the burden of proof in
disciplinary proceedings involving alleged violations of these Rules.82
Thus, this draft of the California Rule attempted to protect clients83 by
requiring the lawyer to prove that the client was fully cognisant of the
implications of their sexual relations. Effectively, this burden of proof
would have been overcome by evidence of the client's informed consent,
as is the practice in Nova Scotia with respect to business related "lawyer
- client" conflicts of interest. However, critics suggested that this provi-
sion would "substantially increase the probability that clients will bring
81. Interestingly enough, the California rule 3-120 includes a Discussion section, similar to
Nova Scotia's Commentary. In this Discussion section, a rationale for the rule that is provided
is similar to that provided in proposed Chapter 24 in Nova Scotia.
82. The California rule 3-120 has gone through six public Drafts; "F' added the rebuttable
presumption. Cf. Y. Levy, supra, note 1, for a criticism of this approach.
83. Jorgenson and Sutherland, supra, note 20 at 502.
A Conflict is a Conflict is a Conflict
fraudulent and frivolous" claims.84 In the end, the California Supreme
Court struck out this rebuttable presumption paragraph.
85
IV. Conclusion
The law and its institutions change as social conditions change. They must
change if they are to preserve, much less advance, the political and social
values from which they derive their purposes and their life. This is true of
the most important of legal institutions, the profession of law. The
profession, too, must change when conditions change in order to preserve
and advance the social values that are its reason for being. 6
In his defence, Mr. MacDonald's counsel argued that a Rule against
sexual relations between a lawyer and his client did not exist. Further-
more, if the Barristers' Society wished to discipline members for such
activity, then it must provide fair warning against the offending behaviour
in the form of an explicit Rule:
Counsel made the point that if a member of the Society is going to be held
accountable for certain conduct, then the Code should particularize that
kind of conduct as constituting conduct unbecoming so that members are
given reasonable notice. The law, he argues, must be certain, not vague.'
Mr. MacDonald, in his own testimony, stated that "his training, practice
and observations from others in the profession" had led him to believe
that only where a client's "legal rights" are affected would sexual
relations between a lawyer and client become a problem."
It is commendable that the Legal Ethics Committee of the Nova Scotia
Barristers' Society has proposed a Rule on this matter, particularly in
light of the fact that their effort is the first of its kind in Canada. To guide
members properly, however, the Rule that is put in place must be
consistent with the existing fiduciary obligations that lawyers have to
their clients. It must also be practical to apply in regard to detection,
84. Levy, supra, note 1 at 651. But note that Levy does not explain how that probability can
be supported in light of the fact that, where the same rebuttable presumption is in place in
business fiduciary relations, no such increase of frivolous claims has occurred. Levy supports
protection, in an explicit rule for "emotional vulnerable" clients, without a rebuttable
presumption, leaving other clients to rely on protection from the existing rules of professional
conduct.
85. Supra, note 16 at 76. The California State Legislature sent Governor Pete Wilson a
tougher statute, which was signed in September 1992. Ibid., at 79.
86. Cheatham, "Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual Lawyer
and the Organized Bar" (1965), 12 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 438 at 440, as quoted in the CBA Code of
Professional Conduct (1987), supra, note 38 at Preface, note 4.
87. Re MacDonald, supra, note 7 at 28.
88. Ibid., at 9 (emphasis added).
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policing and voluntary compliance. Furthermore, it must not send con-
flicting messages to the lawyers and to members of the public which it
professes to be trying to protect. Proposed Rule 24 does not satisfy these
basic requirements in its present form.
This article's central thesis is that a conflict is a conflict. To differen-
tiate personal from business relations between lawyers and clients in the
Rules of professional conduct relies on an illusory distinction, and tacitly
approves of one kind of breach of the fiduciary duty, while formally
prohibiting another. A Rule regarding this kind of relationship should
draw upon the existing Rules in the Handbook regarding fiduciary
duties.89
In areas of business relations, Nova Scotia has adopted a rebuttable
presumption model. Like California, personal relations should also be
governed with the same protection against misuse of a lawyer's influence
over the client. Only with a rebuttable presumption, discharged by a
lawyer who obtains the client's informed consent, will clients be fully
protected where detection of a transgression is otherwise difficult. And,
only a rebuttable presumption places the burden of proof appropriately on
the lawyer, rather than the complainant.
It may appear absurd to require a lawyer to obtain the informed consent
of a client, preferably in writing as is required in business relations, prior
to engaging in sexual relations. That absurdity, however, arises only from
the assumption that a lawyer - client sexual relationship is a normal,
consensual association. In fact, however, it is not. By the very nature of
the lawyer - client fiduciary relationship, a power imbalance exists and
the client is vulnerable. By introducing the formality of informed consent,
that very fact is underlined. The conflict of interest is all too conspicu-
ously illuminated if the lawyer is unable to place his client's best interests,
protected in these circumstances by a full consideration of the serious
implications of an intimate relationship between lawyer and client, before
his own immediate desires.
89. See "Appendix A" for an alternative proposal for Chapter 24 as drafted by the author.
A Conflict is a Conflict is a Conflict
Appendix A:
Proposed Alternative Rule by Matthew Certosimo
Sexual Relations with a Client
Rule
(a) A lawyer has a duty not to initiate, request, suggest or engage in a
sexual relationship with a client, unless the lawyer has the informed
consent of the client.
(b) For the purposes of this Rule, a lawyer has a client's informed
consent to enter into a sexual relationship with that client where the
client consents, preferably in writing, to the relationship after the
lawyer, preferably in writing, has
(i) recommended to the client that the client seek independent
legal advice respecting the implications of their relationship on
the client's legal representation; and
(ii) fully disclosed the possible implications on that client's legal
affairs of a sexual relationship between the lawyer and that
client. 90
(c) A lawyer has a duty not to:
(i) require or demand sexual relations with a client incident to or
as a condition of any professional representation; or
(ii) employ coercion, intimidation or undue influence in entering
into sexual relations with a client;91 or
(iii) represent a client with whom the lawyer is having or has had
a sexual relationship if the lawyer's independent professional
judgement is likely to be impaired because of such relation-
ship.
(d) In disciplinary proceedings arising from a breach of this Rule, the
lawyer has the burden of showing his or her good faith, that adequate
disclosure was made to the client of the implications of the relation-
ship and that the client's informed consent was obtained.9
Guiding Principles
1. For the purposes of the Rule, "sexual relationship" includes sexual
intercourse between a lawyer and client and any other conduct with
a client which may reasonably be interpreted as sexual.
90. Based on Chapter 7, Handbook, supra, note 3.
91. Parts (i) and (ii) are based on California rule 3-120.
92. Based on Chapter 6.8.
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2. For the purposes of the Rule, if the clieht is an organization or body
corporate, any individual overseeing the representation and giving
instructions to the lawyer shall be deemed to be the client.
3. This Rule does not apply to sexual relations between a lawyer and the
lawyer's spouse nor to a consensual sexual relationship which
predates the initiation of the lawyer - client relationship.
Commentary
24.1 The relationship between a lawyer and client is a fiduciary
relationship of the very highest character and all dealings between a
lawyer and client that are beneficial to the lawyer will be strictly
scrutinized. Where a lawyer exercises undue influence over a client or
takes unfair advantage of a client, discipline is appropriate.
